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I. INTRODUCTION
While the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 1 was
expected to open doors for people with disabilities that had long been
closed, the ADA is widely regarded as a disappointment, especially in
the employment context, where absurd results are not uncommon. 2 To
bring a claim of employment discrimination under the ADA, a
plaintiff must show “(1) he is disabled, (2) he is qualified to perform
the essential function of the job either with or without reasonable
accommodation, and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Ph.D. candidate, Indiana University Bloomington.
1
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
2
See, e.g., Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992, 994-95 (citing a case in which a
plaintiff suffering from schizophrenia was denied a job because the employer said
she was “physically and mentally incapable of having a job,” yet lost her case for not
being able to prove she was regarded as having a mental impairment); Alex B. Long,
Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217-18 (2008)
(relating a case in which a plaintiff with cancer brought suit against his employer and
died before the resolution of the case, which posthumously found that the plaintiff’s
cancer was not limiting enough to be considered a disability under the Act).
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because of his disability.” 3 Intuitively, one might suspect it would be
the third prong of the definition—proving that he suffered an adverse
employment action because of his disability—that that would be a
challenge for a plaintiff. However, contrary to expectations, and
contrary to past practice, it is the first prong, whether a plaintiff has a
disability under the law, which has proved challenging. 4 Time and
time again, individuals with a wide range of serious impairments—
from epilepsy to diabetes to cancer—have not met the statutory
definition of “disability.” 5 And in case after case, the courts have
narrowed their interpretation of the ADA, applying stringent
requirements in order for plaintiffs to be considered disabled. Indeed,
legal commentators have concluded that what was once celebrated as
“the most comprehensive civil rights legislation passed by Congress
since the 1964 Civil Rights Act” has become increasingly narrowed to
the point of being in danger of becoming ineffective. 6 How did the
interpretation of the ADA move so far from its original intent? And
what can be done about it?
On July 26, 2007, the 17th anniversary of the ADA’s passage,
legislation to amend the ADA was introduced in the House 7 and
Senate, 8 resulting in the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments
Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), 9 a compromise bill negotiated between
business 10 and disability groups. 11 The broad purpose of the ADAAA
3

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Furnish v. SVI Sys., Inc., 270 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir.

2001).
4

Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal AntiDiscrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 139 (2000).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2007-2008).
8
Americans with Disabilities Act Restoration Act of 2007, S. 1881, 110th
Cong. (2007-2008).
9
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553
[hereinafter ADAAA of 2008].
10
Business groups included U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Society for Human
Resource Management, and National Association of Manufacturers.

254
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/3

2

Goodwin: A Disability by Any Other Name Is Still a Disability: Log Cabin,

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 2

Spring 2009

was “[t]o restore the intent and protections of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990.” 12 Rejecting the reasoning and standards
enunciated by the Supreme Court in a number of cases over the last
ten years 13 and calling for the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) 14 to revise its regulations, 15 Congress
intended the ADAAA to reinstate a broad scope of protection for
people with disabilities. 16 The ADAAA starts off with the same
definition of “disability” found in the original ADA, requiring (a) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of an individual, (b) a record of such an
impairment, or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment. 17
11

Disability groups included Epilepsy Foundation, American Diabetes
Association, American Association of People with Disabilities, and National
Disability Rights Network.
12
ADAAA of 2008.
13
See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded
by statute, ADAAA of 2008 (holding that whether an impairment substantially limits
a major life activity is to be determined by taking into account the ameliorative
effects of mitigating measures); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555
(1999) (declaring that the mitigating measures rule applied not just to artificial
measures, but also to “measure undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the
body’s own systems”); Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002),
superseded by statute, ADAAA of 2008 (creating demanding standards for the terms
“substantially” and “major” in the definition of disability and holding that to be
substantially limited in performing a major life activity under the ADA, “an
individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual
from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives”).
14
Congress has charged the EEOC with enforcing the ADA.
15
Congress expects that the EEOC will revise the term “substantially limits,”
as defined in its current regulations to mean “significantly restricted,” to be
consistent with the ADAAA. ADAAA of 2008 § (2)(b)(6).
16
ADAAA of 2008 § (2)(a)(1).
17
(1) DISABILITY.—The term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an
individual—
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. . .
ADAAA of 2008 § 3.
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However, the amendments then make important revisions, including
instructions to the courts regarding how the terms of the Act should be
interpreted, clarifications to the “substantially limits” language,
expansion of the “major life activities” concept, and substantial
changes to the “regarded as” prong. 18 According to the EEOC, “[t]he
effect of these changes is to make it easier for an individual seeking
protection under the ADA to establish that he or she has a disability
within the meaning of the ADA.” 19
Just three months before the ADAAA went into effect, 20 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
summary judgment in a controversial case involving an alleged ADA
violation for refusing to hire an applicant because she was human
immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) positive. 21 The Seventh Circuit’s
majority decision in EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc. calls into question
the court’s approach to ADA cases involving complex disabilities,
such as HIV/AIDS. It also points to the disjuncture between ADA
language and ADA litigation, “between the type of people that
advocates of the ADA presumed would be covered under the law, and
the practical reality of the protection currently afforded by the law.” 22
Because very few cases have been decided yet under the
ADAAA, 23 it is uncertain if the new amendments will close the gap
between Congress’ vision of protecting people with disabilities and the
18

Long, supra note 2, at 218.
THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, NOTICE
CONCERNING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) AMENDMENTS ACT
OF 2008, http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/amendments_notice.html (page last modified
March 10, 2009).
20
The ADAAA was effective as of January 1, 2009.
21
EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 546 F.3d 438 (7th Cir. 2008).
22
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 156.
23
See, e.g., Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examiners, 2009 WL 331638 (6th
Cir. 2009) (holding that because the suit for injunctive relief was pending on appeal
when the amendments became effective, the amendments apply to the case); but see,
e.g., Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850
(9th Cir. 2009) (declining to decide whether the ADAAA applies retroactively and
holding that even under pre-ADAAA case law, the plaintiff provided sufficient
evidence to survive summary judgment).
19
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interpretation of that vision promulgated by the courts and
administrative agencies. Nonetheless, this note suggests that rather
than attempting to distinguish those with disabilities from those
without under the ADA or its amendments, a better policy approach
would be to adopt an overly inclusive conceptualization of disability,
one that captures all individuals in a broad spectrum of disability.
While this concept of disability would technically include a number of
individuals who might never need the ADA’s anti-discrimination
protection, the concept would mirror Title VII, which similarly
provides protection for many people who might never need its
protection. Such an approach would allow the courts to expend less
energy on parsing the definition of disability and deciding who is
covered and more energy on remedying real cases of discrimination
and dismissing others on the basis of their lack of merit. 24
II. LEE’S LOG CABIN
A. Korrin’s Story
Korrin Krause Stewart was diagnosed with HIV when she was
14 years old. 25 One week after Korrin’s initial diagnosis, she found out
her HIV condition had already developed into acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (“AIDS”). 26 In fact, Korrin had had HIV
since birth because her mother, who died when Korrin was nine years
old, was infected with the virus when Korrin was born. 27

24

This concept of a spectrum of disabilities is not new. Similar language and
concepts were proposed in a report from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in
1983 and, more recently, in the work of legal commentator Chai R. Feldblum. See
Feldblum, supra note 4.
25
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at *2, EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, No. 06-3278
(7th Cir. Dec. 15, 2006).
26
Id.
27
Marilyn Marchione, Fears Over HIV Cost Girl Her Job; EEOC Urges
Settlement, Finds ‘Reasonable Cause,’ MILWAUKEE J. SENT., Sep. 2, 2001, at 19, 21;
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 25, at *2.
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When Korrin was 15 years old, she worked as a part-time
bagger and stock person at Quality Foods, a grocery store. 28 She told a
store manager that she had HIV when she was hired, and the manager
told Korrin that the store would be able to accommodate her if she
needed time off for appointments with her physicians. 29 About a
month later, Quality Foods’ upper management found out that Korrin
was infected with HIV. 30 The grocery store fired Korrin because she
was HIV positive, and the EEOC settled a lawsuit against Quality
Foods for unlawful employment practices, violative of the ADA. 31
Just a couple of years later, when Korrin was 18 years old, she
responded to an advertisement in the Wausaw Daily Herald for a
waitress position at Lee’s Log Cabin Restaurant (“Log Cabin”). 32
Although Korrin had never been a waitress before, she had lots of
other restaurant experience, as a bartender, cashier, dishwasher and
server, which she put down on her application.33 Also, since one of the
job requirements was that a waitress be able to lift 25-30 pounds
during a shift, she stated on her application that she had a lifting
restriction of 10 pounds that could not be accommodated. 34 Just two
weeks before applying for this job, Korrin’s doctor had put Korrin on
a lifting restriction until her platelet count increased. 35 The assistant
manager she spoke with said her lifting restriction would disqualify
her from employment, but Korrin told him the restriction was only
temporary. 36
28

Complaint at ¶8(a), EEOC v. Schofield Foods, Inc., d/b/a/ Quality Foods
IGA, 2001 WL 34134856 (W.D.Wis. Sep. 26, 2001).
29
Id. at ¶8(b).
30
Id. at ¶8(c).
31
Id. at ¶8; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 25, at *3-4.
32
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 25, at *2.
33
Id. at *2-3.
34
Id. at *3.
35
Id.
36
Id. There was a dispute in the testimony over who told what to whom.
Korrin insisted that she told the assistant manager that her lifting restriction was
temporary; however, the assistant manager denied that Korrin said anything to him
about the restriction being temporary.
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After not hearing from Log Cabin for about a month, Korrin
went back to the restaurant to check on her application. 37 Korrin
talked to the same assistant manager, who told her that the owner, who
made all the hiring decisions, was out of town. 38 Then, the assistant
manger asked Korrin if she was the girl from Quality Foods, and
Korrin confirmed that she had worked at Quality Foods. 39 Korrin
asked to see her application so she could add some additional
experience, and when the assistant manager got it for her, the
application had “HIV+” written across the front in big letters. 40 Dean
Lee, the owner of Log Cabin, never called or interviewed Korrin, and
she never got the waitressing job.41
B. EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc.
The owner of Log Cabin did go over Korrin’s application with the
assistant manager, including the HIV notation. 42 Lee said he decided
not to hire Korrin because she lacked prior waitressing experience and
because of her lifting restriction. 43 However, at the time of Korrin’s
application, Lee already had in his employ two waitresses with no
prior waitressing experience and a waitress who could not do any
heavy lifting. 44 The EEOC filed suit, alleging that Log Cabin violated
the ADA for not hiring Korrin “because it learned that she was HIV
positive,” and Log Cabin subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Korrin was not disabled nor qualified for the
job. 45

37

Id.
Id.
39
Id. at *3-4.
40
Id. at *4.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at *5.
38
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1. District Court Decision
The district court granted Log Cabin’s summary judgment
motion, deciding that the EEOC had not proved Korrin had a
disability. 46 Although Korrin actually had AIDS, the complaint only
spoke of having HIV, and it was not until the EEOC responded to Log
Cabin’s motion for summary judgment that the EEOC’s affidavits
discussed how AIDS or HIV/AIDS affected Korrin’s life activities. 47
The court concluded that calling Korrin’s condition AIDS was a
“gross departure” from the original complaint that identified her as
HIV positive, and that the EEOC could not be permitted to amend it
pleadings “to allege an entirely new cause of action” when the trial “is
only a month away.” 48 Thus, because the court determined that
“[h]aving AIDS and being HIV positive are not synonymous,” the
only question before it was whether Log Cabin discriminated against
Korrin because she had HIV, and the EEOC had not presented any
evidence showing how HIV alone impacted Korrin’s life activities. 49
Additionally, the district court ruled that even if an AIDS claim
had been brought properly, there was no evidence that Log Cabin
knew Korrin suffered from AIDS. 50 Finally, the district court noted
that it was “questionable” whether the EEOC could prove that Korrin
was a qualified individual with a disability since she was unable to lift
more than 10 pounds. 51 The EEOC appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
2. Seventh Circuit Majority Opinion
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on
slightly different grounds. 52 The court reasoned that summary
46

EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 436 F.Supp.2d 992, 993 (W.D. Wis. 2006).
Id. at 995.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 996.
52
EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 546 F.3d 438, 440 (7th Cir. 2008).
47
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judgment was appropriate because the “EEOC’s failed attempt to
substitute factual premises left an empty record on whether [Korrin]’s
HIV infection limited one or more of her major life activities.” 53
Stating that it need not address whether HIV and AIDS are
synonymous for purposes under the ADA in this case, the Seventh
Circuit found the district court’s judgment to be “manifestly
reasonable” in refusing to “entertain the EEOC’s belated alteration of
the factual basis of its claim.” 54
Citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 55 Judge Sykes, writing
for the majority, stated that for a disability determination the ADA
requires an individualized inquiry into whether a particular physical or
mental impairment substantially limits the major life activities of a
particular individual. 56 According to Judge Sykes, the EEOC
complicated this individualized inquiry by attempting to refashion its
claim from one based on HIV to one based on AIDS. 57
Judge Sykes elaborated on the alleged distinction between
AIDS and HIV by discussing the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Bragdon v. Abbott, 58 in which a pre-symptomatic HIV-infected
woman brought an ADA claim when her dentist refused to fill her
cavity unless she agreed to the work being performed at a hospital and
agreed to pay for the cost of the hospital’s facilities. 59 In determining
whether the claimant was disabled, the Court held that her HIV
satisfied the statutory definition of impairment and concluded that her
infection substantially limited her major life activity of reproduction. 60
The Supreme Court, in Bragdon, described the typical
progression of HIV, from its initial stage until it develops into full-

53

Id.
Id. at 443.
55
527 U.S. 471, 483.
56
Log Cabin, 546 F.3d at 442.
57
Id.
58
524 U.S. 624 (1998).
59
Id. at 628-29.
60
Id.
54
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blown AIDS. 61 These different stages are important, said Judge Sykes,
because the ADA’s applicability depends upon whether the asserted
impairment is a disability within the meaning of the statute, which in
turn depends on whether the impairment substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of the claimant. 62 Accordingly,
“whether an ADA claimant was HIV-positive or had full-blown AIDS
at the time of the alleged discrimination is highly relevant to this
foundational aspect of the claim.” 63
Judge Sykes noted that “being HIV-positive is not the same as
having AIDS, as the Supreme Court discusses at length in Bragdon.
And that’s the material point as to notice here.” 64 Thus, because the
district court and Log Cabin (allegedly) did not know until a month
before trial that the EEOC was basing its disability discrimination
claim on the fact that Korrin had AIDS, not just that she was HIV
positive, this was a major alteration of the claim and the grounds upon
which it rested. 65 When Korrin and the EEOC submitted affidavits
from her doctor describing the effect of AIDS, not HIV, on her life
activities, the court had no choice but to conclude that the EEOC had
not made a threshold evidentiary showing that HIV infection imposed
substantial limitations on a major life activity. 66 Based on Bragdon
and Sutton, holding that the question of disability under the ADA is an
individualized inquiry, the Seventh Circuit declined to adopt a rule
that HIV infection is a per se disability. 67

61

Id. at 635.
Log Cabin, 546 F.3d at 443.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 444.
65
Id. at 443-44. It is worth noting that the EEOC’s response to Log Cabin’s
summary judgment motion, including her doctor’s affidavits, was submitted only a
month before trial because of a mistake by Log Cabin, who failed to properly serve
the EEOC with its motion for summary judgment until well past the court’s deadline
for filing dispositive motions. Due to that mistake, the district court was forced to
revise its entire briefing schedule. Id. at 448, n. 1 (Williams, J. dissenting).
66
Id. at 444-45.
67
Id. at 445.
62
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As an additional or alternative basis to affirm Log Cabin’s
motion for summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit ruled that Korrin
was not a qualified individual under the ADA. 68 The waitress position
at Lee’s Log Cabin Restaurant required individuals “to lift, transport,
and carry objects weighing from 25 to 30 pounds up to 20 or more
times per shift.” 69 Because Korrin indicated on her employment
application that she had a lifting restriction of 10 pounds that could not
be accommodated, 70 she could not be considered “an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires.” 71
Finally, after considering the EEOC’s petition for panel
rehearing and for rehearing en banc, a majority of the Seventh Circuit
judges voted to deny rehearing. 72
3. The Dissents
Judge Williams wrote not one, but two, dissents in EEOC v.
Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc. She dissented from the majority view in the
Seventh Circuit decision, and she wrote another opinion, in which
Judges Rovner, Wood, and Evans joined, dissenting from the denial of
the petition for rehearing. Judge Williams claimed that distinguishing
between HIV or AIDS or HIV/AIDS “misses the point of the ADA.” 73
She argued that the EEOC did not change its claim because a person
diagnosed with AIDS is also HIV positive. “To the extent there is a
difference between HIV and AIDS . . . , the majority’s focus on

68

Id.
Id.
70
Id.
71
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
72
EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, 546 F.3d 438 (2008), rehearing denied, No. 063278 (7th Cir. Feb. 2, 2009).
73
Id. at 447 (Williams, J. dissenting).
69
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nomenclature overlooks whether that difference is consequential in
this case.” 74
Citing to Bragdon, Sutton and Kirkingburg, Judge Williams
concluded that the determination of whether an individual has a
disability is not necessarily based on the name of the impairment, but
rather on the impact of that impairment on the life of the individual. 75
Like the majority, Judge Williams pointed to the detailed description
the Supreme Court in Bragdon makes of the illness’ progression for a
person who is HIV-positive. 76 However, she emphasized that Bragdon
does not characterize AIDS as distinct from being HIV-positive. 77
Instead, the Supreme Court’s analysis, she said, breaks down the
course of illness into three stages—the final stage being AIDS—but
HIV is a disease that can render a person disabled at all stages. 78
In Judge Williams’ dissent from the denial of rehearing en
banc, she argued that the majority imposed a higher pleading
requirement for claims with multi-stage disabilities. 79 The EEOC met
its threshold burden pursuant to the federal notice pleading standard by
providing a short and plain statement of the grievance: Log Cabin
refused to hire Korrin because it found out she was HIV positive. 80
“The exact stage of HIV is a detail—and an irrelevant one at that.” 81
As required by this standard, any facts consistent with the allegations
could be proved later without needing an amended complaint. 82
However, the majority speculated that the reason the EEOC did
not plead AIDS in its complaint is because there was no evidence Log
74

Id. at 448.
Id. at 447; see Bragdon, supra note 58 at 637; Sutton, supra note 13 at 483;
Kirkingburg, supra note 13 at 566.
76
EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, 546 F.3d 438, 448 (2008), rehearing denied, No.
06-3278 (7th Cir. Feb. 2, 2009).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, 546 F.3d 438 (2008), rehearing denied, No. 063278 at *4 (7th Cir. Feb. 2, 2009).
80
Id. at *8.
81
Id.
82
Id. at *5.
75
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Cabin knew Korrin had AIDS. 83 Whether this is true, Judge Williams
said in dissent, is not the issue. Log Cabin knew Korrin was HIVpositive, and requiring employers to have specific knowledge of the
actual extent of a disability goes beyond the pleading requirements. 84
The majority’s holding, Judge Williams concludes, “creates an
insurmountable hurdle for ADA plaintiffs with complex disabilities”
and raises serious questions about the conceptualization of disability in
this country. 85
III. CONCEPTS OF DISABILITY IN FEDERAL LAW
A. A Short History of the Concept of Disability in America
Disabled people have been out of the mainstream of
American life for two hundred years. And these years have
seen the construction of modern American society—its
values, its heritage, its cities, its transportation and
communications networks. So that now, when they are
coming back into our society, the barriers they face are
enormous. 86
The concept of disability in America has gone through a slow,
painful change over the last 200 years. In colonial America, people
with disabilities were viewed with both revulsion and pity. 87
Gradually, as medical technology advanced, disabled people were seen
as objects of rehabilitation and cure. 88 The government’s relationship
to people with disabilities reflected public perception and attitudes of

83

Id.
Id. at *7.
85
Id. at *3, *6.
86
FRANK BOWE, HANDICAPPING AMERICA (Harper & Row, 1978).
87
Examples of ridicule, torture, imprisonment, and execution of disabled
people throughout history are not uncommon, while societal practices of isolation
and segregation have been the rule. BOWE, supra note 86, at 3-8.
88
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 94.
84
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the time: disabled people were viewed first in terms of their
dependency and later in terms of their capacity for rehabilitation. 89
In the 18th century, the disabled were lumped together with
widows and orphans, the poor, the elderly, the mentally ill, and others
who could not provide for themselves and relied on community
support. 90 For those who had no family support, the government
provided subsistence by establishing “poor laws” and paying private
individuals to take in the disabled and provide room, board, and
care. 91 By the 1820s, the familial and community construct of society
was changing and people with disabilities found much less local
support. 92 The government responded by constructing large
almshouses that took in the disabled, along with juvenile delinquents,
prostitutes, the elderly, and the poor.93
The almshouses continued to grow throughout the 1800s,
despite their reputation for deplorable conditions, and people with
disabilities continued to share them with abandoned children, drifters,
petty criminals and poor immigrants. 94 The assumption with regard to
people with disabilities was an inability to function effectively in
society. Hence, the disabled were excluded and kept outside the
mainstream of society, first to protect the disabled from society95 and
later to protect society from the disabled. 96
89

Id.
DAVID ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 4 (Aldine Transaction 2002) (1971).
91
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 18 (1983) [hereinafter ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM].
92
ROTHMAN, supra note 48, at 4-5.
93
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91.
94
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 95.
95
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91, at 19. “This philosophy
emphasized ‘benevolent shelter’ and resulted in large institutions housing greater
numbers of disabled people far from population centers.” Id.
96
For example, a 1934 article in a Kentucky law journal calling for a
sterilization statute in Kentucky issued the following warning:
Since time immemorial, the criminal and defective have been the “cancer
of society.” Strong, intelligent, useful families are becoming smaller and
smaller; while irresponsible, diseased, defective families are becoming
larger. The result can only be race degeneration. To prevent this race
90
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The early 20th century saw a shift in society’s perception of
people with disabilities. The basic principle was that a disability is an
infirmity that could be fixed or cured. 97 Disabled people must be
rehabilitated and returned to gainful employment to increase national
production and decrease welfare spending. 98 At the end of World War
I, a mass of injured returning war veterans prompted Congress to
establish laws governing the rehabilitation of individuals with
disabilities. 99 The Smith-Sears Veterans’ Rehabilitation Act was
enacted in 1918 “to provide for vocational rehabilitation and return to
civil employment of disabled persons discharged from the military or
naval forces.” 100 Two years later, the Smith-Fess Act was signed into
law as the first federal civil vocational rehabilitation act for individuals
with disabilities who were not war veterans. 101
This conception of disability was termed the medical model of
disability, as opposed to the exclusionary model of earlier years.102
The medical model presumed that the problem of disability was within
the individual, who must change to fit the surrounding society, rather
than any aspect of the environment changing to make life easier for the
disabled individual. 103 The definition of disability at this time focused
on the impact an individual’s disability had on his or her capacity to
work, and on the extent to which such an individual would benefit
from vocational rehabilitation programs. 104 For those individuals who
suicide we must prevent the socially inadequate persons from propagating
their kind, i.e., the feebleminded, epileptic, insane, criminal, diseased, and
other.
Note, “A Sterilization Statute for Kentucky,” KY. L.J., vol. 23 (1934), at 168,
cited in ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91, at 20 n. 23.
97
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SHARING THE DREAM: IS THE ADA
ACCOMMODATING ALL? 6 (2000) (hereinafter SHARING THE DREAM).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Vocational Rehabilitation Act, ch. 107, 40 Stat. 617 (1918) (amended 1919).
101
Smith-Fess Act, ch. 219, 41 Stat. 735 (1920) (repealed 1973, and re-enacted
in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355).
102
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 96.
103
Id.
104
The Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1954 defined “physically
handicapped individual” to mean “any individual who is under a physical or mental
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could not work, Congress established Social Security Disability
Insurance (“SSDI”) 105 and the Supplemental Security Income program
(“SSI”) to provide support for disabled individuals. 106 To qualify as
disabled and receive cash benefits under both of these programs, an
individual must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment.” 107
As the modern civil rights movement in America gained
momentum, protections against disability discrimination also became
part of the discussion. 108 The courts became involved in mostly
unsuccessful attempts to remedy disability discrimination. 109 For
example, in 1965 a New York City schoolteacher sued the state public
school system when he was excluded from a teaching position because
of his blindness. 110 The court held that the school board was
authorized to disqualify teaching applicants based on vision
requirements. 111 However, in 1969, a court in Utah applied the
principles of equal educational opportunity established in Brown v.
Board of Education 112 to people with disabilities, holding that the
exclusion of two mentally retarded children from the state’s public
schools was unconstitutional. 113 This decision started a landslide of
lawsuits alleging disability discrimination in transportation, housing,
disability which constitutes a substantial handicap to employment, but which is of
such a nature that vocational rehabilitation services may reasonably be expected to
render him fit to engage in remunerative occupation.” Pub. L. No. 565, § 11(b), 68
Stat. 652, 660 (1954).
105
Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880 § 103(a), 70 Stat.
807, 815-24 (1956).
106
Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329
(1972).
107
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994) (SSDI); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1994)
(SSI).
108
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 97.
109
SHARING THE DREAM, supra note 97, at 6.
110
Chavich v. Bd. Of Exam’rs, 23 A.D.2d 57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965).
111
Id. at 60-61.
112
349 U.S. 294 (1954).
113
Wolf v. State Legislature, Civ. No. 182646 (3d Judicial Dist., Salt Lake
County, Utah, Jan. 8, 1969).
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medical services, contracts, voting, and confinement in residential
treatment facilities. 114 A new attitude towards the disabled began to
develop that continued the rehabilitation model of disability but also
sought to protect the civil rights of disabled people. 115
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Too many handicapped Americans are not served at all, too
many lack jobs, and too many are underemployed—utilized
in capacities well below the levels of their training,
education, and ability . . . [I]f we are to assure that all
handicapped persons may participate fully in the rewards
made possible by the vocational rehabilitation program, we
must devote more of our energy toward elimination of the
most disgraceful barrier of all—discrimination. 116
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not address
disability discrimination, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 117 was
eventually signed into law and took a significant step toward
implementing a national policy to integrate people with disabilities
into society. 118 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 119 provides that

114

SHARING THE DREAM, supra note 97, at 6 (citing ROBERT L. BURGDORF JR.,
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau
of National Affairs, 1995)).
115
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 97.
116
119 Cong. Rec. 24, 587 (1973). Senator Taft (R-Ohio), a sponsor of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, speaking in support of the Act (cited in
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91, at 49).
117
29 U.S.C. § 790 (repealed 1992).
118
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91, at 47.
119
The remaining sections of the Rehabilitation Act also sought to further equal
rights for disabled individuals: Section 501 requires affirmative action hiring and
advancement programs for federal agencies (29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (Supp. IV 1998)),
Section 503 has similar requirements for federal governmental contractors with
$10,000 or more in federal contracts (29 U.S.C. § 793(a)), and Section 502
established the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access
Board), which issued guidelines for accessible designs and a uniform set of
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“no otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States. . .shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance.” 120 Section 504 was patterned on nearly identical
provisions in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting
discrimination based on race in any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance, and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, prohibiting discrimination based on sex in any
educational program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance. 121
In 1974, Congress expanded the definition of “handicapped
individual” for purposes of Section 504 to read as follows: any person
who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person’s major life activities, (ii) has a record of
such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment. 122 The amended definition reflected Congress’ concern
with protecting the disabled against discrimination stemming not only
from simple prejudice, but also from “archaic attitudes and laws” that
proliferated because the American people were simply unfamiliar with
and insensitive to the difficulties confronting individuals with
disabilities. 123
While the act declined to define “substantially limits” or
“major life activities,” the act’s regulations gave a non-exhaustive list
of examples of impairments, including “orthopedic, visual, speech,
and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular
dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental
retardation, emotional illness, and. . .drug and alcohol addiction”; and
examples of major life activities, including “functions such as caring
standards for building accessibility pursuant to the act’s requirements (29 U.S.C.
§ 792(a),(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1998)).
120
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1998) (cited in Feldblum, supra note 4, at 98-99).
121
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 99.
122
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)
123
S. Rep. No. 93-1297, p. 50 (1974) (cited in Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. at 279).
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for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 124
In an important 1979 Supreme Court case, a woman was fired
from her job as a schoolteacher because she had several lapses of
tuberculosis. 125 The issues that the Court decided were whether the
definition of a handicapped individual included people with
contagious diseases and whether the ability to transmit a contagious
disease could ever be considered a handicap under Section 504. 126 The
Court found that the schoolteacher was a handicapped individual
under Section 504 127 because, as the Court explained:
We do not agree with petitioners that, in defining a
handicapped individual under § 504, the contagious effects of
a disease can be meaningfully distinguished from the
disease’s physical effects on a claimant in a case such as this.
[The schoolteacher’s] contagiousness and her physical
impairment each resulted from the same underlying
condition, tuberculosis. It would be unfair to allow an
employer to seize upon the distinction between the effects of
a disease on others and the effects of a disease on a patient
and use that distinction to justify discriminatory treatment. 128
The Court did not spend much time analyzing whether a particular
impairment sufficiently qualifies as a disability, instead focusing
primarily on the “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability. 129
By providing a broad interpretation of this prong, the Court
acknowledged Congress’ finding that society’s myths and fears about
124

45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2007); 28 C.F.R § 41.31 (b)(2) (2007).
Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
126
The Supreme Court also considered whether the schoolteacher was
qualified for the job, but the Court determined further findings of fact were needed
before that question could be answered. Id. at 288-89.
127
Id. at 284.
128
Id. at 282.
129
Id. at 284.
125
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disability “are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow
from actual impairment.” 130 In fact, the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the “regarded as” prong seemed sufficiently broad to
capture any individual who had been discriminated against because of
any impairment. 131
When analyzing historical perceptions of disability, the judicial
interpretations and the agency implementations of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 become significant because Congress used the same
defining language in both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 132
Indeed, many in Congress viewed the ADA as merely an extension to
the private sector of the public sector requirements already found in
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 133 Because Congress felt
comfortable with the manner in which the definition of disability had
been applied thus far, and because disability rights advocates felt
comfortable that the same individuals who had been covered under
existing disability anti-discrimination law would be covered under the
new law, the definition of disability in the ADA was taken directly
from the definition in the Rehabilitation Act. 134 Such repetition
demonstrates Congress’ sanctioning of this broad interpretation and
implementation, which it endorsed and incorporated into the ADA.
C. Overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act
[The ADA] signals the end to the unjustified segregation and
exclusion of persons with disabilities from the mainstream of
American life. As the Declaration of Independence has been a
beacon for people all over the world seeking freedom, it is
my hope that the Americans with Disabilities Act will

130

Id.
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 92 (emphasis added).
132
Id. at 128.
133
Id. at 92.
134
Id.
131
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likewise come to be a model for the choices and opportunities
of future generations around the world. 135
On July 26, 1990, a day that President George H.W. Bush
likened to another “independence day,” 136 the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 137 was signed into law. This Act, he said,
would allow the 43 million Americans with disabilities to “pass
through once-closed doors into a bright new era of equality,
independence, and freedom.” 138 The ADA was the world's first
comprehensive civil rights law for people with disabilities, 139
prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities in
employment (Title I), 140 in public services (Title II),141 in public
accommodations (Title III) 142 and in telecommunications (Title IV). 143
Acknowledging that an ever increasing population of
Americans was physically or mentally disabled, 144 Congress addressed
the discrimination against individuals with disabilities by establishing
a “clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 145 According to
the ADA, “[t]he term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an
individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a

135

President George Bush, Statement Upon Signing S. 933, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
601, 602 (1990).
136
President George H.W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1067, 1067 (July 26, 1990), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/bushspeech.html.
137
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
138
Bush, supra note 136.
139
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, The Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA): 1990-2002, http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/ (last modified Oct. 15,
2002).
140
42 U.S.C. § 12111–12117.
141
Id. § 12131–12165.
142
Id. § 12181–12189.
143
47 U.S.C. § 225.
144
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(1).
145
Id. § 12101 (5)(1).
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record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.” 146
Therefore, to be considered disabled under section (A) of the
ADA, a person must (1) have an impairment (2) that substantially
limits (3) a major life activity. However, as with the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, Congress did not define the terms “physical or mental
impairment” or “major life activities,” leaving it to the EEOC and
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to issue regulations and the courts to
apply them. 147 Further, the ADA regulations adopted the same nonexhaustive list of major life activities 148 as found in Section 504 the
Rehabilitation Act, and Congress specifically ordered the courts not to
apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under the
Rehabilitation Act or its regulations to ensure that the ADA’s
regulations and jurisprudence were not eroded by the courts. 149
The ADA regulations issued by the DOJ were very similar to
the comparable Section 504 regulations, including an almost identical
definition of disability. 150 Nothing in the DOJ’s regulations suggested
that courts would need to engage in an individual assessment with
regard to most impairments to determine if a particular individual had
a disability. 151 In contrast, the EEOC regulations introduced, for the
first time in disability jurisprudence, the idea of an individualized
assessment to determine whether a person had a disability under the
ADA. 152 Also for the first time, the EEOC defined the term
“substantially limits” 153 and set forth factors to be considered when
determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major
life activity. 154 Such a determination, the EEOC noted, must be made
146

Id. at § 12102 (2).
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 134.
148
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2007).
149
42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2007).
150
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 134.
151
Id. at 135.
152
Id.
153
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (1999).
154
Id. at § 1630.2(j)(2).
147
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on a case by case basis, “without regard to mitigating measures such
as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices.” 155
Sections (B) and (C) of the ADA definition of disability also
come directly from the language of the Rehabilitation Act and reflect
Congress’ desire to prohibit discrimination based not only on an actual
disability, but also on a history of disability or the perception of
disability. 156
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY
UNDER THE ADA
A. Supreme Court Decisions
1. Bragdon v. Abbott (1998)
The Supreme Court’s only decision on what constitutes a major
life activity within the context of HIV/AIDS is Bragdon v. Abbott. 157
Abbott, an asymptomatic HIV positive woman, went to see Bragdon
for a dental appointment. 158 When the dentist became aware of her
HIV status, he refused to fill her cavity in his office and told her he
would only perform the procedure at a hospital and if she bore the
additional expenses. 159 Abbott brought suit under Section 12182(a) of
the ADA, 160 and the Court granted certiorari to review “whether HIV
infection is a disability under the ADA when the infection has not yet
progressed to the so-called symptomatic phase.” 161 The Court had
155

Id.
See Arline, 48 U.S. at 284 (discussing Congress’ pre-ADA concern about
perceived impairments).
157
524 U.S. 624 (1998).
158
Id. at 628.
159
Id. at 629.
160
“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who . . .
operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
161
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628.
156
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little trouble concluding that because of its effect on the hemic and
lymphatic systems from the moment of infection, HIV satisfies the
definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the
disease. 162 Considering reproduction to be a major life activity, the
Court then found that HIV infection had a personal, individual effect
on Abbott’s life, deterring her from reproducing. 163 The Court
concluded that Abbott’s HIV infection qualified as a disability under
the ADA because it substantially limited the major life activity of
reproduction. 164
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court declined to address the issue of
whether HIV is a per se disability under the ADA, limiting the
decision’s guidance for lower courts and leaving the door open to
discrimination against those who are not able to reproduce or have no
intention to reproduce. 165
2. The Sutton Trilogy (1999)
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. and its companion cases, 166 the
Supreme Court addressed the major life activity prong of the disability
definition. The Court announced a new standard, which required that
the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a
major life activity must be balanced against the “ameliorative effects
of mitigation measures,” such as medication or medical devices. 167 In
Sutton, twin sisters with severe myopia were denied the opportunity to
become commercial airline pilots because they did not meet the
airline’s minimum vision requirement, which was uncorrected visual
acuity of 20/100 or better. 168 Although the sisters’ uncorrected vision
162

Id. at 637.
Id. at 641.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 642.
166
527 U.S. at 471 (1999); Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555; Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
167
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
168
Id. at 475.
163
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was 20/200 in the right eye and 20/400 in the left eye, with the use of
corrective measures, both could function identically to individuals
without a similar impairment. 169
The Court carefully parsed the language of the ADA’s definition
of disability and held that because the definition uses the “present
indicative verb form,” a person must be presently, not potentially or
hypothetically, substantially limited. 170 Since the sisters’ impairment
could be mitigated by corrective measures and thus was no longer
substantially limiting, the sisters were not disabled under the ADA. 171
Likewise, in Murphy v. United Parcel Service, a case decided the
same day, the Court upheld Murphy’s termination because his
hypertension was controlled by medication. 172 Murphy was hired as a
mechanic, which also required him to drive commercial vehicles. 173
However, when a medical supervisor reviewed his blood pressure
tests, Murphy was fired on the belief that his blood pressure exceeded
the Department of Transportation’s (“DOT”) requirements for drivers
of commercial motor vehicles. 174 Murphy filed suit under Title I of the
ADA. 175 Given its holding in Sutton, the Supreme Court affirmed that
with his medication, Murphy functioned normally in everyday
activities, and thus he was not a person with a disability under the
ADA. 176
Finally, in Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 177 the last of the Sutton
trilogy, the Supreme Court declared that the mitigating measures
169

Id.
Id. at 482.
171
Id. at 482-83.
172
527 U.S. at 519.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 520.
175
Id. at 518. “No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a).
176
Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
177
527 U.S. 555 (1999).
170
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standard applied not just to artificial corrective measures, but also to
“measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body’s
own system.” 178 Kirkingburg, a monocular individual, 179 was fired
from his job as a truck driver because he could not meet the basic
DOT vision standard, and Kirkingburg sued under the ADA. 180
While allowing that most monocular individuals would ordinarily
be considered disabled under the ADA, the Supreme Court ruled that
Kirkingburg did not qualify. 181 Kirkingburg’s brain had developed
subconscious mechanisms for coping with his monocularity and thus
his body compensated for his disability. 182 The Court held that the
ADA “requires monocular individuals, like others claiming the Act’s
protection, to prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of
the limitation in terms of their own experience, as in loss of depth
perception and visual field, is substantial.” 183 Thus, because his body
had learned a way to make his impairment less limiting, Kirkingburg
could not be disabled and was not protected under the ADA.
3. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (2002)
The Supreme Court continued its trend of interpreting disability
narrowly, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams, 184 by holding that the term “major life activities” “refers to
those activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily
life.” 185 The Court went on to say that under the ADA, this term
needed to be “interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for
178

Id. at 555-56.
Kirkingburg suffers from amblyopia, a general medical term for “poor
vision caused by abnormal visual development secondary to abnormal visual
stimulation” Id. at 559, n 3 (citing K. Wright et al., Pediatric Ophthalmology and
Strabismus 126 (1995)).
180
Id. at 560.
181
Id. at 567.
182
Id. at 565-66.
183
Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
184
534 U.S. at 184.
185
Id. at 198.
179
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qualifying as disabled.” 186 In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Williams
worked on an engine fabrication assembly line using pneumatic tools,
which eventually caused her to develop painful medical conditions of
the muscles and nerves, including carpal tunnel syndrome,
myotendinitis, and thoracic outlet compression. 187 After her
employment was terminated, Williams filed a charge of disability
discrimination, alleging her employer failed to reasonably
accommodate her disability. 188
In substantiating her claim of disability, Williams said that her
physical impairments substantially limited her in (1) manual tasks; (2)
housework; (3) gardening; (4) playing with her children; (5) lifting;
and (6) working. 189 To be substantially limited in performing manual
tasks, the Supreme Court found, an individual must have an
impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from
doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily
lives, and the impairment’s impact must be permanent or long term. 190
The Court emphasized the need for an individualized assessment of
the effect of an impairment, especially when the impairment is one
that varies from person to person. 191 Repeating the findings of the
Sutton trilogy, the Court said that it is not enough to submit evidence
of a medical diagnosis of an impairment; instead, for a claimant to
prove a disability requires offering evidence that, in terms of the
individual’s own experience, the extent of the limitation is
substantial. 192
Finally, with the regard to what may be considered a manual task,
the Supreme Court held that “the manual tasks unique to any particular
job are not necessarily important parts of most people’s lives. As a
result, occupation-specific tasks may have only limited relevance to
186

Id. at 197.
Id. at 187, 196.
188
Id. at 190.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 198.
191
Id. at 199.
192
Id. at 198; see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483; Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 566.
187
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the manual task inquiry.” 193 Rather, the inquiry should focus the
variety of tasks central to most people’s daily lives, e.g., tending to
personal hygiene and carrying out personal or household chores. 194
Because there was evidence that Williams was able to perform these
types of tasks, 195 her limitations did not establish a manual task
disability as a matter of law. 196
The Supreme Court also emphasized that courts should not
engage in hypothetical inquiries as to the severity of impairments but
must focus instead on the individual in her present state.197 In other
words, the Supreme Court requires an individualized inquiry and
rejects the notion of per se disability under the ADA.
V. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AMENDMENTS ACT
A. Has Anything Changed?
Although the ADAAA starts with essentially the same threepronged definition of disability that existed under the original ADA, 198
the primary purpose of the ADAAA is to broaden the definition of the
term disability and make it easier for individuals to qualify for the
law’s protections. 199 Section 2(b)(5) of the ADAAA expressly states
that the determination of whether an individual has a disability “should
not demand extensive analysis”; 200 while Section 3(4)(A) provides
that the definition of disability “shall be construed in favor of broad
coverage of individuals under this Act, to the maximum extent
193

Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201 (2002), superseded
by statute, ADAAA of 2008.
194
Id. at 192.
195
Id. at 201-02.
196
The Supreme Court did not consider the working, lifting, or other
arguments for disability status that had been preserved below but which were not
ruled upon by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 193.
197
Id. at 198.
198
See supra note 15.
199
ADAA of 2008, supra note 9, § 2(b).
200
Id. at § 2(b)(5).

280
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/3

28

Goodwin: A Disability by Any Other Name Is Still a Disability: Log Cabin,

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 2

Spring 2009

permitted by the terms of this Act.” 201 These sections are consistent
with the broad interpretation of disability found in Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the broad view enunciated by the
Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. 202
Section 3 of the ADAAA expands the definition of “major life
activities” and provides two non-exhaustive lists as examples. The first
list includes previously recognized activities, as well as three new
ones: reading, bending, and communicating. 203 The second nonexhaustive list clarifies that major life activities include activities that
constitute the operation of a major bodily function, including but not
limited to “functions of the immune system, normal cell growth,
digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory,
endocrine, and reproductive functions.” 204
Although proof that an individual has an impairment will not
be sufficient by itself to establish that the individual has a disability,
Section 2(b)(5) states that “the primary object of attention in cases
brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the
ADA have complied with their obligations, and. . .the question of
whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA
should not demand extensive analysis.” 205 This change expresses a
lower standard than the Supreme Court’s strict and demanding
201

Id. § 3(4)(A).
29 U.S.C. § 790 (repealed 1992).; Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Airline,
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
203
The first list in its entirety includes “caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”
ADAAA of 2008, supra note 9, at § 3(2)(A). However, on April 6, 2009, the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to accept a petition by a fired oil field safety worker to
reverse an appeals court ruling that driving is not a “major life activity” under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Kellogg v. Energy Safety Servs. Inc., d/b/a Oilind
Safety, U.S., No. 08-1013, cert. denied (Apr. 6, 2009).
204
ADAAA of 2008, supra note 9, § 3(2)(B). For example, cancer would
affect an individual’s major bodily function of normal cell growth, kidney disease
would affect bladder function, and HIV would affect functioning of the immune
system.
205
Id. at § 2(b)(5).
202

281
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009

29

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 2

Spring 2009

standard found in the Sutton trilogy and Toyota Motor
Manufacturing. 206
The ADAAA further provides that “[a]n impairment that is
episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a
major life activity when active.” 207 In the past, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that courts should refrain from hypothetical inquiries as to
the severity of impairments and instead must focus on the individual in
his or her present state. 208 However, with these changes, courts must
consider whether an impairment would substantially limit a major life
activity if it were active.
In Section 3(4)(E)(i), the ADAAA states that ameliorative
effects of mitigating measures, other than ordinary eyeglasses or
contact lenses, shall not be considered when assessing whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity. 209 This
reversal of the analysis set forth in the Sutton trilogy goes on to
provide that if an employer uses a qualification standard based on an
individual’s uncorrected vision, the employer must show that the
standard is related to the job and consistent with a business
necessity. 210
One of the most significant changes to the ADA involves the
“regarded as” prong of the original definition. According to the
“Findings and Purposes” section of the ADAAA, one of the purposes
of the amendments is “to reinstate the reasoning of the Supreme Court
in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. . .which set forth a broad
view of the third prong of the definition of [disability] under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” 211 The ADAAA sets forth a separate
definition of the “regarded as” prong:
An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded
as having such an impairment” if the individual establishes
206

See supra note 13.
ADAAA of 2008, supra note 9, at § 4(a).
208
See e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482; Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198.
209
ADA Amendments Act, supra note 9, § 3(4)(E)(i).
210
Id. § 5(b).
211
Id. § 2(b)(3).
207
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the he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under
this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or mental
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is
perceived to limit a major life activity. 212
Thus, the “regarded as” prong once again seems sufficiently broad to
capture almost any individual who had been discriminated against
because of almost any impairment. 213
These are the most significant changes made to the definition
of disability under the ADAAA. Other changes include a new
provision concerning the duty of a covered entity to accommodate an
individual that the covered entity regards as having a disability and an
express statement concerning the authority of federal agencies to issue
regulations concerning the definition of disability. 214
B. Log Cabin Redux
Had Korrin Krause Stewart’s case been decided just a few
months later than it was, after the ADAAA had gone into effect, the
outcome may have been quite different. The analysis of her claim of
disability discrimination would have been looked at through a broader
lens, where the focus would be on evaluating the merits of her claim,
rather than on determining whether she met the definition of disability.
To bring a disability discrimination claim under the ADA, a
plaintiff must show “(1) he is disabled; (2) he is qualified to perform
the essential function of the job either with or without reasonable
accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action
because of his disability.” 215 Contrary to the expectations of the ADA
drafters, the courts began to interpret the first prong more and more
strictly, creating a demanding standard for being considered

212

Id. at§ 4(a).
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
214
Long, supra note 1, at 223.
215
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
213
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disabled. 216 Thus, claimants found, somewhat perversely, that a wide
range of serious impairments did not meet the statutory definition of
disability. 217 With the passage of the ADAAA, however, getting past
the first prong in bringing a disability discrimination claim will likely
be less onerous.
For Korrin, who was not considered disabled because she did
not make a sufficient showing of how HIV (rather than AIDS)
substantially impaired any of her major life activities, being
considered disabled now would arguably be much easier. Section 3 of
the ADAAA clarifies that major life activities include activities that
constitute the operation of a major bodily function, including functions
of the immune system. 218 Thus, Korrin’s HIV infection would qualify
as substantially impairing a major life activity, and, in turn, she would
be considered a disabled individual under the ADA.
However, the inquiry into Korrin’s disability discrimination
claim does not stop there. She must now show that she is qualified to
be a waitress at Log Cabin with or without reasonable accommodation
and that she was not hired because she has HIV/AIDS. Will Korrin be
successful in her claim? The answer is unclear until there is further
investigation into the merits of her claim; but now at least, under the
ADAAA, Korrin’s claim will reach the merits.
C. The Future of the ADAAA
What does the future hold for the ADAAA? Since the ADAAA
went into effect on January 1, 2009, few cases have yet to be decided
under the new amendments. A case filed on February 13, 2009, in the
Ninth Circuit noted that while the court’s decision was pending, the
ADAAA was signed into law. 219 The court declined to consider
whether the ADAAA applied retroactively in this case because even if
216

Feldblum, supra note 4, at 139.
Id.
218
ADAAA of 2008, supra note 9, at § 3(2)(B).
219
Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 555 F.3d
850, 853 (2009).
217
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the ADAAA were applicable, the claimant provided sufficient
evidence that he was a qualified individual to survive summary
judgment under pre-ADAAA law. 220
In a disability discrimination case in the Sixth Circuit, the court
vacated the judgment and remanded the case “[b]ecause this suit for
injunctive relief was pending on appeal when the amendments became
effective, [and] the amendments apply to this case.” 221 The plaintiff’s
status under the ADA turned on the definition of “substantial
limitation,” which changed under the ADAAA. 222 Thus, the district
court’s legal conclusions would have to be reconsidered in light of the
new law. 223
An even more recent case in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois held that the court would apply the law
in force when the events of the case occurred. 224 Although the plaintiff
argued that the ADAAA should apply because it restored Congress’
original intent that disability claims should be broadly construed, the
court noted that the ADAAA “does not contain an express provision
for retroactive application, and courts will not apply a statute to events
preceding the effective date if doing so would cause a retroactive
effect.” 225
Legal commentators are already discussing some of the
controversial and potentially contentious issues brought about by the
passage of the ADAAA. One article shows that the ADAAA fails to
address certain important issues, including the so-called “single-job
rule,” short-term impairments, the “record of” prong, whether
interacting with others qualifies as a major life activity, and the limited

220

Id.
Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examiners, No. 08-5371, 2009 WL 331638
(C.A.6 (Ky.)) at *1.
222
Id. at *2.
223
Id.
224
Pennie v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 07-C1596, 2009 U.S. Dist. WL
855787, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2009).
225
Id.
221

285
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009

33

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 2

Spring 2009

guidance provided on reasonable accommodations. 226 Another
commentator argues that “courts in employment discrimination cases
often show surprising disregard for Congress’ disapproval of
precedent.” 227 Calling these repudiated precedents “shadow
precedents,” the article suggests that Congress’ check on judicial
power is not as robust as typically assumed because courts tend to rely
on shadow precedents rather than interpret the new language of a
congressional override. 228
Legal practitioners also are discussing the amendments and the
future of the ADAAA. With titles such as “Recent Amendments to
Federal Law Increase Protection for the Disabled,” “Disabling the
ADAAA,” “The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Who Isn’t
Disabled?” and “The New and Expanded Americans with Disabilities
Act,” these articles discuss the changes to disability law and conclude
generally that the efficacy of the ADAAA will only become clearer as
more and more courts consider disability discrimination issues under
the new statutory guidelines. 229
VI. A BETTER DEFINITION OF DISABILITY
Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom
of the well and in the kingdom of the sick. Although we
prefer to use only the good passport, sooner or later each of

226

For a discussion of the unresolved issues under the ADAAA, see Long,
supra note 1, at 226-29.
227
Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers:
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511,
582 (2009).
228
Id. at 511.
229
See generally Lynne M. Hook & Stacey A. Lee, Recent Amendments to
Federal Law Increase Protection for the Disabled, LOS ANGELES LAW., FEB. 2009,
AT 10.; Stephanie Wilson & E. David Krulewicz, Disabling the ADAAA, NJ LAW.,
Feb. 2009, at 37; Edward G. Phillips, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Who Isn’t
Disabled?, TENN. BAR J., Feb. 2009, at 33; Sandra B. Reiss & J. Trent Scofield, The
New and Expanded Americans with Disabilities Act, ALA. LAW., Jan. 2009, at 38.
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us is obliged, at least for a spell, to identify ourselves as
citizens of that other place. 230
The rulings in cases such as the Sutton trilogy, Toyota Motor
Manufacturing., and Log Cabin made it harder for people to prove that
their impairments caused a substantial limitation in some life activity
but at the same time did not make them unqualified for the jobs they
sought. 231 With the revisions made to the definition of disability and
other significant changes under the ADAAA, fewer individuals will
find themselves in this catch-22 situation of having to prove both
substantial limitation and qualification for employment in order to
bring a discrimination claim.
However, even with the ADAAA’s insistence on a broad
definition of disability, the law still seems to rest on the premise that
anti-discrimination protection is necessary and appropriate for a
limited group of individuals who are very different from “normal,”
non-disabled people. Though much more subtle in ends and means
than were historical perceptions of disability, the current perception of
disability retains a clear dividing line between the disabled and the
nondisabled. This disabled-nondisabled dichotomy “is the wellspring
of [disability] discrimination.” 232
The drafters of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the
disability rights activists who pushed for the ADA’s passage
envisioned a very different picture of disability. 233 In their vision,
people with disabilities have a spectrum of impairments, from mild to
moderate to severe. 234 There is no dividing line between those with
disabilities and those without, because anyone with an impairment, no
matter how trivial or mild, could still be covered under this view if he
or she was discriminated against. 235 The one unifying aspect is that the
230

SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR 3 (Picador, 1978).
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 160.
232
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91, at 93–94.
233
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 161.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 161-62.
231
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individual either has to have, or has to be perceived as having, an
impairment, i.e., an aberration in a physical or mental system. 236
Unlike race and gender classes which include specific groups of
people who will remain (mostly) in those exclusive groups, disabilities
are nonexclusive: everyone is eligible to become disabled. 237
According to one commentator, “Most disabled people are
adventitiously impaired. That is, they became disabled rather than
being born that way.” 238
The Sutton case raised the question of whether people who
wear glasses and contact lenses should be considered disabled under
the ADA. 239 While people with disabilities historically had been
considered others or different from the rest of us, and to the extent that
people with disabilities were traditionally perceived as unable to
function in society, the twin sisters in Sutton brought disability antidiscrimination law closer to home. 240 If the disability issue before the
Supreme Court concerned people with glasses and contact lenses,
where was the line to be drawn?
Variously termed a range, a spectrum, or a continuum, under
this view of disability, almost any person would be able to invoke the
protection of the law. 241 Imagine that everyone in society is on a
continuum of impairments: at one side of the continuum are people
with ingrown toenails; further along are people who wear glasses or
have high blood pressure; even further along the continuum are people
with cancer or diabetes or HIV infection; and at the far end of the
continuum are people who are blind or use wheelchairs. 242 For
example, take the simplistic categorization of blind versus sighted.
Vision is not one-dimensional, but involves a number of component

236

Id. at 162.
Id. at 145.
238
Bowe, supra note 44, at 34.
239
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 153.
240
Id.
241
Id. at 101.
242
Id.
237
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functions, and for each function there is a range of abilities. 243 At one
end of the vision spectrum are a few people with unusually good
eyesight, and at the other end are people who have no vision
whatsoever. However, the vast majority of people fall somewhere
between the two extremes of the vision continuum. 244 “A similar
continuum occurs for all of our physical and mental abilities. For each
human function, there are some who excel, some who perform poorly,
if at all, and some who perform at all levels in between.” 245
It would seem to make perfect sense, then, to consider, not the
dichotomous classification of disabled versus non-disabled, but rather
a spectrum of disability that includes everyone. While the disability
spectrum would result in the inclusion of a number of people who
might never need the anti-discrimination protection of the ADA, it
would in fact mirror Title VII, which similarly provides protection to
people who might never its protection. 246 Thus, a person with an
ingrown toenail can prove she has an impairment, and hence is
covered under the ADA, just as a man can prove he has a sex, and
hence is covered under Title VII. 247 Both individuals would then have
to prove they were fired because of the impairment or the sex,
respectively. 248
In reality, men are not usually fired because they are men, and
women are not usually fired because they have ingrown toenails.
However, as a matter of public policy, men should not be fired simply
because they are men, and women should not be fired simply because
they have ingrown toenails. 249 Thus, even though neither Title VII nor
the ADA were passed to combat the problems of discrimination
against men or women with ingrown toenails, “the resultant protection
against discrimination based on gender or impairment should be
243

ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91, at 87.
Id.
245
Id. at 88.
246
Feldblum, supra note 4, at 163.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id. at 163-64.
244
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equally available to any individual who has experienced
discrimination on the basis of the identified component.” 250
VII. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin
represents just how far the determination of what constitutes a disabled
individual has moved away from the original vision of the ADA’s
drafters and supporters. In an attempt to restore the ADA to its original
purpose, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.
Whether these amendments will produce dramatic changes in the way
the administrative agencies and courts apply the ADA remains to be
seen. Nonetheless, the real test of the amendments efficacy will be the
manner in which they help break down the myths, stereotypes, and
fears surrounding the concept of disability that continues today.

250

Id. at 164.
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